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ABSTRACT
Database access logs are large, unwieldy, and hard for hu-
mans to inspect and summarize. In spite of this, they remain
the canonical go-to resource for tasks ranging from perfor-
mance tuning to security auditing. In this paper, we address
the challenge of compactly encoding large sequences of SQL
queries for presentation to a human user. Our approach is
based on the Weisfeiler-Lehman (WL) approximate graph
isomorphism algorithm, which identifies salient features of a
graph — or in our case of an abstract syntax tree. Our gen-
eralization of WL allows us to define a distance metric for
SQL queries, which in turn permits automated clustering of
queries. We also present two techniques for visualizing query
clusters, and an algorithm that allows these visualizations
to be constructed at interactive speeds. Finally, we evalu-
ate our algorithms in the context of a motivating example:
insider threat detection at a large US bank. We show ex-
perimentally on real world query logs that (a) our distance
metric captures a meaningful notion of similarity, and (b)
the log summarization process is scalable and performant.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Database access logs are used in a wide variety of settings,
from performance monitoring, to benchmark development,
and even to database auditing and compliance. Examin-
ing a history of the queries serviced by a database can help
database administrators with tuning, or help security an-
alysts to assess the possibility and/or extent of a security
breach. However, logs from enterprise database systems are
far too large to examine manually. As one example, our
group was able to obtain a log of all query activity at a ma-
jor US bank for over a period of 19 hours. The log includes
∗The first three authors contributed equally and should be
considered a joint first author
nearly 17 million SQL queries and over 60 million stored pro-
cedure execution events. Even excluding stored procedures,
it is unrealistic to expect any human to manually inspect all
17 million queries.
Let us consider an analyst (let’s call her Jane) faced with
the task of analyzing such a query log. She might first at-
tempt to identify some aggregate properties about the log.
For example, she might count how many times each table is
accessed or the frequency with which different classes of join
predicates occur. Unfortunately, such fine-grained proper-
ties do not always provide a clear picture of how the data is
being used, combined, and/or manipulated. To get a com-
plete picture of the intent of users and applications interact-
ing with the database, Jane must look at entire queries. So,
she might turn to more coarse-grained properties, like the
top-k most frequent queries. Here too she would run into a
problem. Consider the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM R WHERE R.A = 1
SELECT * FROM R WHERE R.A = 2
They differ only in the value of a single constant: 1 or 2.
When counting queries, should she count these as the same
query or two different queries? If she chooses to count them
together, are there perhaps other “similar” queries that she
should also count together, like for example:
SELECT * FROM R WHERE R.B = 1
Of course the answer depends on the content of the log,
the database schema, and numerous other details that may
not be available to Jane immediately when she sits down
to analyze a log. As a result, this type of log analysis can
quickly become a tedious, time-consuming process.
In this paper, we introduce a framework that automati-
cally creates compact, easy-to-consume summaries of large
query logs. The first part of this framework is an algorithm
for extracting features from the abstract syntax trees (ASTs)
of SQL queries. The resulting feature vectors help to define
a similarity metric for queries, which in turn allows us to
cluster queries into groups based on their structure.
To further aid users in their understanding of query logs,
we propose two techniques for summarizing and visualizing
queries in a cluster: (1) a text explanation that overviews
common features of queries in the cluster, (2) a graph vi-
sualization that presents these features in the context of an
actual query.
1.1 Motivating Application: Ettu
It is increasingly important for organizations to be able to
detect and respond to cyber attacks. An especially difficult
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class of cyber attack to detect is the so called insider at-
tacks that occur when employees misuse legitimate access to
a resource like a database. The difficulty arises because ap-
parently anomalous behavior from a legitimate actor might
still have legitimate intent. For example, a bank teller in
Buffalo who withdraws a large sum for a client from Cali-
fornia may be acting legitimately (e.g., if the client has just
moved and is purchasing a house), or may be committing
fraud. The “U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey” [1] states
that 37% of organizations have experienced an insider in-
cident, while a 2015 study [2] identified insider attacks as
having the longest average response time of any attack type
surveyed: 54.5 days.
The challenge of addressing of insider attacks lies in the
difficulty of precisely specifying access policies for shared re-
sources such as databases. Coarse, permissive access policies
provide opportunities for exploitation. Conversely, restric-
tive fine-grained policies are expensive to create and limit
a legitimate actor’s ability to adapt to new or unexpected
tasks. In practice, enterprise database system administra-
tors regularly eschew fine-grained database-level access con-
trol. Instead, large companies commonly rely on reactive
strategies that monitor external factors like network activity
patterns and shared file transfers. In a corporate environ-
ment, monitoring user actions requires less preparation and
gives users a greater degree of flexibility. However, exter-
nal factors do not always provide a strong attestation of the
legitimacy of a database user’s actions.
The Ettu1 system, currently under development at the
University at Buffalo [3], seeks to help analysts to monitor
query access patterns for signs of insider attack. Database
logging and monitoring is expensive, so Ettu needs to be able
to identify normal, baseline database behaviors that can be
easily flagged as “safe” and ignored from normal logging and
post-mortem attack analysis. In this paper, we focus on one
concrete part of the overall Ettu system, responsible for sum-
marizing and visualizing query logs. In the complete system,
this component serves to help analysts generate patterns of
safe queries, and to quickly analyze large multi-day query
logs to identify potential attack activity.
1.2 Contributions
In addition to enabling insider threat analysis [3], the abil-
ity to quickly visualize patterns in query logs has potential
applications for new benchmark development [4], database
tuning [5], and privacy analysis [6]. This paper represents
a first step towards effective summarization for query logs.
Concretely, in this paper we: (1) identify and motivate the
challenge of log summarization, (2) adapt the Weisfeiler-
Lehman approximate graph isomorphism algorithm [7] to
the task of feature extraction from SQL queries, (3) propose
Euclidean distance over the resulting feature vectors as a
similarity metric for SQL that can be used create clusters
of structurally similar queries, (4) introduce techniques for
visualizing and summarizing the queries in each cluster, and
(5) experimentally demonstrate that our similarity metric
mirrors human intuition and that our clustering and visual-
ization processes are scalable.
This paper is organized as follows. We provide back-
1Ettu is derived from the last words of the Roman emperor
Julius Caesar, “Et tu, Brute?” in Latin, meaning “You, too,
Brutus?” in English to emphasize that this system is meant
to detect the unexpected betrayals of trusted people
ground information that creates a basis for our research in
Section 2 and introduce our core contribution, a technique
for query similarity evaluation, in Section 3. We next ex-
plain our proposed clustering and summarization techniques
in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we evaluate
the accuracy and performance of our proposed techniques.
We compare our approach to related work in Section 7. Fi-
nally, we conclude by identifying the steps needed to deploy
query summarization into practice in Section 8.
2. BACKGROUND
As a declarative language, the abstract syntax tree (AST)
of a SQL statement acts as a proxy for the intent of the
query author. We thus argue that structural similarity is a
meaningful metric for query similarity. Naively, we would
group a query Q with other queries that have nearly (or
completely) the same AST as Q. This structural definition
of intent has seen substantial use already, particularly in the
translation of natural language queries into SQL [8].
SELECT
COLS FROM WHERE
COL_ID A !=
A.a A.b A.a 5
Figure 1: An abstract syntax tree of query SELECT A.a, A.b
FROM A WHERE A.a != 5.
For the remainder of this paper, we will use Q to de-
note both the query itself as well as its tree encoding. An
ideal distance metric would measure the level of similarity
or overlap between these tree encodings and their substruc-
tures. Naively, for two SQL queries Q1 and Q2, one satis-
factory metric might be to count the number of connected
subgraphs of Q1 that are isomorphic to a subgraph of Q2.
Subgraph isomorphism is NP-complete, but a computation-
ally tractable simplification of this metric can be found in
the Weisfeiler-Lehman (WL) Algorithm [7] illustrated as Al-
gorithm 1. Instead of comparing all possible subgraphs of
Q1 against all possible subgraphs of Q2, the WL algorithm
restricts itself to specific types of subgraphs.
Given a query Q, let N ∈ Q denote a node in Q. N
is initially labeled with the SQL grammar symbol that N
represents. The i-descendent tree of N : desc(N, i) is the
sub-tree rooted at N , including all descendants of N in Q
up to and including a depth of i.
Example 1. Given the tree in Figure 1, desc(COLS, 2) is
the tree containing the nodes COLS, COL_ID, A.a, and A.b.
The WL algorithm identifies a query Q by all possible i-
descendent trees that can be generated from Q:
id(Q) = { desc(N, i) | N ∈ Q ∧ i ∈ [0, depth(Q)] }
Here depth(Q) is the maximum distance from the root of Q
to a leaf. To make this comparison efficient, subtrees are
deterministically assigned a unique integer identifier, and
the query is described by the bag of Q’s i-descendent tree
Algorithm 1 Weisfeiler–Lehman Algorithm
1: procedure Weisfeiler–Lehman
2: for each tree t ∈ T do
3: H ← depth(Q)
4: for h← 1;h ≤ H;h + + do
5: for each node N ∈ Q do
6: s← CreateSet(labelsof{N} ⋃∑N.children)
7: if hashtable.get(s) 6= null then
8: label(N)← hashtable.get(s)
9: else
10: hashtable.put(s, label(N))
11: end if
12: if IsLeaf(
∑
N.children) then
13: N.IsLeaf = true
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
18: end procedure
identifiers. Thus two query trees with an isomorphic subtree
will both include the same identifier in their description.
The bag of identifiers is encoded as a (sparse) feature vector
and allows Euclidean distance to measure the similarity (or
rather dis-similarity) of two queries.
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Figure 2: Weisfeiler-Lehman algorithm applied on AST
given in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows how the WL algorithm is applied on the
AST of the query given in Figure 1. First, every distinct
node of the AST gets labeled with a unique integer. If
the same node appears more than once, each instance is
labeled with the same integer. As the algorithm progresses,
the dotted box emphasizes the region being examined, while
the text below represents new labels being synthesized from
existing labels. Grey nodes have been fully labeled, while
white nodes are still being processed.
3. SYSTEM OUTLINE
The log summarization mechanism in Ettu operates in
three stages: (1) A vectorization phase where the ag-
gregated query logs are processed into feature vectors, (2)
An offline clustering phase where the feature vectors are
grouped together according to their structural similarity,
and (3) A summarization phase where the clusters are
summarized to present a human user with a concise overview
of the cluster’s distinguishing features. These stages are il-
lustrated in Figure 3.
Query 
Vectors
Query 
ClustersQuery 
ClustersQuery 
ClustersQuery 
Clusters
(1) Vectorization
(2) Clustering
(3) Summarization
Query 
Logs
Query 
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ClustersQuery 
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of 
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Figure 3: The typical query auditing workflow in Ettu.
The initial input to Ettu is a log of query activity pro-
cessed by the target database. The log may be annotated
with supplemental metadata like usernames and timestamps.
The goal of the methodology described here is to produce a
concise, but precise sketch of the most common query struc-
tures in the log. This summary contains information about
groups of similar queries aiming to explain what a query in
each group looks like and what kind of features are expected
to be encountered in a query.
Scenario 1. Jane feeds the logs collected to Ettu. The
system processes the file and groups similar queries together
and passes them to the next stage of the operation.
3.1 Generalization of Weisfeiler-Lehman
The WL algorithm assumes zero knowledge about struc-
tural features of the trees it compares, limiting itself to i-
descendent subtrees. Conversely, the grammar of SQL has
a very well-defined structure. In Ettu, we exploit this struc-
ture to eliminate redundancy and create features that more
reliably encode the query’s semantics. We specifically iden-
tify and address three features of SQL that limit the effec-
tiveness of WL.
First, the number of features created by the WL algorithm
is large. Although clustering naturally prunes out features
without discriminative power, we can use SQL’s semantics
to identify structures that are unlikely to be useful. For ex-
ample, the subtree desc(SELECT, 1) in Figure 1 is common to
virtually all queries. Such features can be pruned preemp-
tively.
Second, constants in the query require special treatment
in feature encoding. The output of this operation is a query
skeleton.
Example 2. Consider the query SELECT * FROM R WHERE
R.a = 1. Subtree R.a = 1 can be abstracted as R.a = ? be-
cause there is much higher probability that this abstraction
will be shared thus it correctly captures commonality among
queries while feature R.a = 1 can coexist offering distin-
guishing power ( ? denotes the placeholder constant)
Finally, SQL makes frequent use of commutative and as-
sociative operators. The semantics of such operators may
overlap, even if their i-descendent subtrees do not.
Example 3. Consider the Boolean expressions A AND B
and A AND B AND C. The former AST is a AND node with
2 children while the latter has 3. Although the two ASTs
have 3 0-descendent subtrees in common, they share no 1-
descendent subtrees; WL ignores the similarity between the
two conjunctive expressions.
To address these challenges we first generalize WL algorithm
to allow the creation of dynamic, language-specific features,
and then use this facility to present a suite of features that
permit the generalized W-L algorithm to reliably detect fea-
tures of SQL queries.
3.2 Dynamic Features
Feature generation process can be explained in three steps:
(1) Based on the structure of the query AST and exist-
ing set of features, use some rules to identify collections
of existing features as candidates for new feature creation;
(2) Use a set of constraints to filter out undesirable fea-
tures; (3) Offer a function digest(·) to synthesize new fea-
ture labels from these collections of existing features. To be
more precise, suppose we are given a query Q, each node
N ∈ Q has a set of features FN , initially defined as the
singleton set containing its SQL grammar atom. A rule is
applied to construct FN from the node itself, features gener-
ated by other rules, and the feature sets of its descendants:
{ FC | C is a descendent of N }. A constraint acts as a filter,
removing features from consideration. Rules and constraints
are applied in a pre-defined priority order, bottom-up to the
nodes of Q to compute feature sets for each of Q’s nodes. Fi-
nally, the feature vector of Q is defined by the bag
⊎
N∈Q FN
of all features from all nodes of Q. Note that each node has
at most one instance of a feature (FN is a set), while an
entire AST Q might have multiple instances of the feature
(the feature vector of Q is a bag).
Let us consider the steps of feature generation in reverse
order. First, to define features by structural recursion, we
need a way to synthesize new feature identifiers from collec-
tions of existing identifiers. We define a function digest(·)
that deterministically constructs feature identifiers from ex-
isting collections (whether bags, sets, or lists) of identi-
fiers. The output of digest(·) is deterministic and unique:
for any collection A, digest(A) = digest(A) and for any
two collections A 6≡ B, digest(A) 6= digest(B). Unique-
ness is achieved by maintaining a persistent table of all
Predicate Description
Node(N) Node N in query AST.
Atom(N, f) Feature f encodes the grammar atom of
node N .
Child(Nc, Np, n) Node Nc is nth Child of Np.
Own(N, f) N owns f or equivalently Feature f is in
set FN of Node N .
Table 1: Dynamic Feature Selection Predicates.
identifiers assigned, while determinism for bags and sets
is achieved by first sorting features in the collection. We
will denote list, bag, and set digests as digest`([a, b, a, c]),
digestb({|a, a, b, c|}), and digests({a, b, c}), respectively.
Example 4. List-digests respect order, and as a result
digest`([a, b, a, c]) 6= digest`([a, a, b, c]). Bag-digests re-
spect multiplicity but not order, so digestb({|a, b, a, c|}) =
digestb({|a, a, b, c|}), but also that digestb({|a, a, b, c|}) 6=
digestb({|a, b, c|}). Finally, set digests differentiate neither,
so digests({a, a, b, c}) = digests({a, b, c})
Second, we wish to ignore features that are semantically
uninformative, like the 1-dependent subtree desc(SELECT, 1)
in Figure 1. Given a list of these features and/or patterns
describing these features, we can mark unwanted features by
in the table of identifier assignments generated by digest(·).
Unwanted feature identifiers are simply not added to FN as
it is constructed.
Finally, we consider the construction of new features by
structural recursion. We have found that all of the cus-
tomized features we are interested in creating can be ex-
pressed through first–order logic, or more precisely though
datalog [9]. In datalog, logic rules are expressed in the form
Head(Y ) : −Body(XY ) ≡ ∀y∃x (Body(xy)→ Head(y))
Here, Body(XY ) is a conjunction of first–order predicates
over act as conditions, true for some set of valuations to
the variables XY . The rule indicates that the conjunction
of predicates Head(Y ) should be true for any valuation for
which there exists some X for which Body(XY ) is true.
For rule generation, we employ two types of predicates:
• Structural predicates, which are defined according the
AST’s graph structure. We use two structural pred-
icates: Node(N) is true for all nodes N ∈ G and
Child(Nc, Np, n) is true if Nc is the n-th child of Np.
• Feature predicates,which are defined by the rule sys-
tem. The feature predicate Atom(N, f) is true if f is
the feature encoding the grammar atom for node N
in the AST. Rules define new features by populating
predicate Own(N, f) with Atom(N, f) as initial ele-
ments N would own.
For easy explanation, we present Table 1 with built-in pred-
icates that we will use in our feature generating rules. We
will first show that Weisfeiler-Lehman algorithm can be eas-
ily re-formalized under datalog using recursion in 3.2.1. Fi-
nally, in 3.2.2-3.2.3, the solutions for challenges brought by
WL algorithm are re-formalized in datalog.
3.2.1 Weisfeiler-Lehman Revisited
We first show that the base Weisfeiler-Lehman algorithm
can be easily re-formalized under datalog with recursion and
aggregation. In practice, the model of datalog that we use
is loosely based on that of LogiQL [10] which supports ag-
gregate and grouping operations.
1. IterF (N, fN , 0) : − Atom(N, fN )
2. with f = digest`([fN , digestb({|∀fC |})])
IterF (N, f, n) : −
IterF (C, fC , n− 1), Child(C,N, ),
Atom(N, fN ), (n < Height(N))
3. Own(N, f) : − IterF (N, f, )
Predicate IterF (N, f, n) is an intermediate store for fea-
tures f created for node N at iteration n. denotes a wild-
card that accepts anything and we denote aggregate group-
ing by a ∀ symbol. Line 1 serves as initial condition. Starting
from line 2, the datalog expression forms a group of all child
labels fC assigned during the prior iteration and computes
a bag-digest over the result (digestb({|∀fC |})).
3.2.2 Skeletons
To give special treatment to binary expressions which we
only care about its left hand side, Example 5 shows a rule
that works on Equality operator.
Example 5. Name : Equality Skeleton
with f = digest`([fp, fl, ?])
Own(f,Np) : −
Atom(Np, fp), Np = Equals,
Child(Nr, Np, 2), Atom(Nr, fr), Const(fr),
Child(Nl, Np, 1), Atom(Nl, fl), ¬Const(fl)
? is a placeholder indicating a constant value. Const is
a unitary predicate indicates whether a string represents a
constant value. This datalog expression seeks any node Np
in the AST whose grammar atom is Equals and whose right
child’s atom is a constant. Right child is replaced by ? and
digest`([fp, fl, ?]) generates the resulting feature that en-
codes the 1-descendent subtree AST rooted at Np.
3.2.3 Conjunctive Normal Form
In response to the challenge brought by commutative and
associative operators, one solution would be pre-processing
the query AST and converting the composite boolean for-
mula into Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). Since boolean
formula in the query reveal the intent by which the query is-
suer defines and limits the desired data records, algebraically
equivalent boolean formula reflect the same intent. Thus
CNF normalization which re-formalizes an equivalence class
of boolean formula into a uniform structure helps to gener-
ate features more informative in the sense of intent. CNF
is preferred over Disjunctive Normal Form(DNF) as CNF is
structurally more sensitive to logic OR expressions which is
one of the major tools of retrieving additional data records.
For example, the structure of OR-piggybacked formula ((A
AND B) OR C) in its CNF changes to ((A OR C) AND (B
OR C)) comparing with AND-piggybacked formula (A AND
B AND C). In this section, we show that pre-processing the
subtree of some boolean formula into its CNF can be trans-
lated into rules expressed in datalog.
First, we introduce the basic predicates and notations
used in this section. CNF is a conjunction of clauses in
which each clause is a disjunction of literals. A literal is an
atomic boolean formula or its negation. Accordingly, we de-
fine unitary predicate L(N) to indicate that node N is the
root of the subtree in the AST that represents a literal. Any
literal in a composite formula can be located by seeking a
boolean operator node with zero logic connectives within its
operand’s subtree. Hence the predicate L(N) can be realized
by creating rules that enumerate all root nodes of literals in
a boolean formula. As the AST subtree of a literal can be
fully represented by its root, we give it the special notation
NL that distinguishes it from common node notation.
Logic OR operator is commutative, hence a Disjunctive
Clause denoted by DC in CNF is a set of literals. The pred-
icate that records the member literals of a DC is denoted as
Member(NL, DC). For simplicity, we use notation DC and
NL representing both the object and the unique ID of the
object. Identification of DC is generated by digesting all
member IDs in its set, denoted as digests({
⋃
NL∈DC NL}).
Since logic AND operator is also commutative, the CNF
of any formula rooted at node N can be viewed as a set
of DCs in which each member is attached to N . We use
a new predicate Attach(DC,N) indicating that DC is at-
tached to N . This predicate enables Ettu to attach the
generated CNF structure to the root of the original boolean
formula. If negated formula are considered, the rule for CNF
normalization should be paired with the rule for DNF nor-
malization. Turning a negated formula into CNF is the same
as turning it into its DNF then its CNF is equivalent to a
conjunction of negated conjunctive clauses of its DNF. For
simplicity we assume there is no negated formula and all
nodes in the example 6 is a descendent of the root of some
target boolean formula.
Example 6. Name: Conjunctive Normal Form
(1) Base case: with DC =digests({NL})
Member(NL, DC), Attach(DC,NL) : − L(NL)
(2) For AND node:
Attach(DC,N) : −
Atom(N, f), f = AND,
Attach(DC,Nc), Child(Nc, N, )
(3) For OR node:
with DC =
digests({
⋃
Member(NL,DCm)∨Member(NL,DCn)NL})
Member(Np, DC),Member(Nq, DC),
Attach(DC,N) : −
Member(Np, DCm),Attach(DCm, Ni),Child(Ni, N, i),
Member(Nq, DCn),Attach(DCn, Nj),Child(Nj , N, j),
Atom(N, f), f = OR, (i 6= j)
Since generating CNF for the sub-formula rooted at any
node only requires information from its children, the CNF
normalization process is bottom-up. For the base case, ex-
pression (1) in the rule creates a singleton bag containing a
chosen literal itself as a new disjunctive clause and attach
it to the root node of the literal. As the process is bottom-
up, nodes assume that each of their children have already
completed CNF and have the resulting disjunctive clauses
attached to it. For root nodes of literals, since they do not
have sub-formula, they only need to provide their CNF up-
wards while root nodes of logic connectives AND and OR
need only combine children CNFs with respect to their own
logic grammar. Expression (2) locates a logic AND node
and attaches all disjunctive clauses from its children to it-
self. However, in expression (3) for logic OR node, we need
to apply distributive law as a disjunction of CNFs need to
be re-formalized as a single CNF. We union any pair of lit-
eral sets (DCm, DCn) attached to different children Ni,Nj
with i 6= j of logic OR node N and the resulting disjunctive
clause DC is attached to N .
4. CLUSTERING
The next step is to cluster query skeletons by their fea-
ture vectors. The result of this process is a set of clusters in
which query skeletons with similar structures are grouped
together. We considered two possible clustering approaches
for use in Ettu: k-means and hierarchical clustering [11]. K-
means outputs a set of query skeletons for k clusters. On
the other hand, hierarchical clustering outputs a dendro-
gram – a tree structure which shows how each query can be
grouped together. For our specific use case where we aim to
summarize groups of similar queries, the number of groups
or clusters is not known in advance. For this reason, we
eventually elected to use hierarchical clustering because it
gives us the flexibility to choose the number of clusters after
computing the dendrogram. In addition, a dendrogram is a
convenient way to visualize the relationship between queries
and how each query is grouped in the clustering process.
Hierarchical clustering recursively selects the closest pair
of data points and merges them into a single virtual data
point. This process requires an agglomerative rule, a for-
mula for aggregating feature vectors together into the vec-
tor of each virtual data point. There are several often used
possibilities, including complete–linkage, single–linkage and
average–linkage. In our experiments, the choice of agglom-
erative rules does not significantly change the clustering re-
sult; all commonly used agglomerative rules produce equally
reliable outputs. Consequently, we arbitrarily chose to use
complete–linkage, in which the farthest distance from a data
point in one cluster to a data point in another cluster is con-
sidered as the distance between two clusters.
Another aspect that we should consider when doing hi-
erarchical clustering is is the distance metric to compare a
pair of data points. In our experiments, we use Euclidean
distance as the distance metric, though other metrics such
as the Manhattan distance gave similar clustering outputs.
5. SUMMARIZATION
To help human inspectors reliably visualize and interpret
clusters, we need a step to present sets of similar queries
as compact summaries. An ideal presentation is in tree-
like form: presenting a coarse view of the cluster at first,
while allowing the inspector to easily unfold portions of the
tree to obtain more detail. As a basis for this visualization,
we observe that each feature is constructed, essentially as a
digest of grammar atoms for a syntactically correct partial
AST, and can be displayed as a subtree.
Each cluster can be characterized by a set of features com-
mon to most, if not all of the queries grouped into it. An
ideal form of summarization then, would first present a set of
characteristic features for the entire cluster, and then allow
users to iteratively subdivide the cluster into smaller and
smaller sub-clusters, each with a progressively larger set of
characteristic features. We call the resulting hierarchical vi-
sualization a recursive feature characterization(RFC).
Generating a RFC requires us to overcome three chal-
lenges: First, allowing a user to navigate through the RFC
at an interactive speed requires scalable memory consump-
tion and the ability to quickly identify clusters with large
numbers of common features. Second, the feature vectors
used for clustering are usually redundant; The same node
may appear multiple times across features representing dis-
tinct subtrees of the AST. We need a way to quickly and
efficiently identify and remove redundant features. Over-
coming the two above challenges is sufficient to produce a
list of features that can be presented to a user. The first and
most basic visualization is: a text-based summary of each
cluster. However, seeing features in isolation without the
context of a surrounding query can make it difficult to un-
derstand the implications of each feature. Consequently, our
third challenge is to create a visualization that can present
feature bags in context.
To address the first challenge, we adopt Frequent Pat-
tern Trees (FP Trees) [12]. Normally, FP Trees is used to
mine frequent patterns of item-sets, for example sets of items
frequently bought together. Individual items in each item-
set are sorted into a sequence and an FP Tree is built by
prefix-aligning these sorted sequences. Any path of nodes
starting from the root of the tree to an internal node in FP
Tree represents a shared prefix of item sequences with each
node counting the number of prefixes that pass it. Each
feature f is constructed as the digest of a set of nodes of
the query AST, the lineage of the feature. The lineage can
be reassembled into a partial AST, denoted by AST f . The
multiplicity of f in the feature bag
⊎
N∈Q FN generated for
query Q is denoted by multQ(f) . For each query we cre-
ate an item-set by constructing 2-tuples from features in
the query
{
〈 f,multQ(f) 〉 | f ∈ ⊎N∈Q FN }. The result-
ing sets of items as 2-tuples are used to build an FP-Tree
for the cluster.
FP Trees offer high compression rates; the ratio of the
size of an FP Tree to the total number of items appearing
in the input item-sets is low. To increase the compression
rate, the item-sets can be sorted in the descending order of
the number of occurrences of each feature tuple. Doing so
increases the chances that item-set prefixes can be shared,
farther increasing the compression rate. This assumption
has been validated experimentally [12] but can still fail, for
example when an item occurs frequently, but as an isolated
singleton. As an optimization to counteract this case, we
considered a metric related to frequency that we call total
popularity. The popularity of a feature in the feature vector
of some query is the number of distinct features that coex-
ist with it. Total popularity is the sum of popularities for
the feature across all queries in the cluster. We compare
the compression rate for FP Tree generated using both fre-
quency and total popularity as sort orders in Figure 4. The
graph shows how compression rate varies with the number
of queries incorporated into the tree. As the number of
queries increases, the compression rate for both approaches
increases super-linearly, suggesting that FP Trees are a good
way to visualize large query clusters, while the use of total
popularity as a sort order provides a small, but measurable
improvement in compression rate.
The FP Tree structure provides a tree-like sub-clustering
of queries that naturally tracks features common to queries
in the sub-clusters. Users can selectively traverse it by fold-
ing or unfolding subtrees to settle on an appropriate level of
detail, without being overwhelmed. Recall that each path
from the root to a current visited node in the FP tree cor-
responds to a prefix of item sequences shared by real life
queries. As the user traverses the tree, Ettu tries to reduce
the length of the prefix by assembling its underlying fea-
ture ASTs and ideally creates a single assembly AST with
updated multiplicity as the summary. In practice, the re-
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Figure 4: Comparison of compression rate of Total Popular-
ity and Frequency in FP tree.
sulting summary is a set of assembly ASTs and we would
like to improve readability by reducing the set size. Further
expanding and visualizing an FP Tree is as intuitive as sim-
ply merging more feature AST components to the existing
assembly AST.
In general, reducing the set size contains two steps: (1)
Shrink and (2) Merge. The shrink step removes redundant
items from the set as a preparation for merge step. Recall
that an item I is of the form 〈 f,multQ(f) 〉. Given a specific
feature fc ∈ ⊎N∈Q FN , the set Sc is defined as{
〈 fp,multQ(fp) 〉 | AST fc ⊂ AST fp , fp ∈
⊎
N∈Q
FN
}
covers all items in the bag whose AST fp fully contains AST fc .
For any item Ip = 〈 fp,multQ(fp) 〉 ∈ Sc, suppose fc oc-
curs mc times in the AST of feature p, by viewing item
Ip, the inspector has already been informed of feature fc
(multQ(fp) ∗ mc) number of times. If we sum this for all
Ip ∈ Sc and compare the sum with the multiplicity of fea-
ture fc, namely if multQ(fc) <
∑
Ip∈Sc multQ(fp)∗mc, item
Ic can be safely removed as redundant. Example 7 shows a
simple case of shrink.
Example 7. Consider a feature f that encodes the ex-
pression A = B with multiplicity 2, 〈 f, 2 〉. Consider an-
other 2-tuple 〈 f ′, 1 〉 in the same feature bag which encodes
A = with multiplicity 1. It is possible that the multiplicity
of A = is less than A = B as it is not necessary that each
subgraph of A = B is included in the bag. By viewing A = B
two times, the inspector is already informed of the existence
of A = structure two times which renders 〈 f ′, 1 〉 redundant.
Merge step further reduces the set size by a sequence of
pairwise merge operation on items. Merge of two items is
not merely the merge of their feature ASTs. The order of
merge operations and the difference in feature multiplicity
between two items should be carefully taken care of. In fact,
the correctness of merge step needs to be verified by counting
the number of original queries that share the resulting set of
ASTs. This count should match with the count of queries,
recorded in the FP Tree, that pass the chosen prefix.
In practice, shrink step is much faster and reliable than
merge step: to guarantee the correctness of merge step, ver-
ification back on the original queries is required while shrink
only involves local comparison on subtrees. In some cases
that shrink step already produces minimal set size, merge
step can be skipped.
Thus we recommend a property called Seal for feature
bags. Part of its goal is skipping merge step.
Definition 1. Property: Seal
Generic Seal: At least the complete subtree rooted at each
node in the AST should be encoded as a feature;
Tailored Seal: For any pair of distinct features in the fea-
ture bag of Q, if they assemble to ASTasmbly which is also
contained in query AST of Q, then structure ASTasmbly
should be included in the feature bag for Q.
Generic Seal guarantees that features generated fully recon-
structs the original query AST. With Tailored Seal, merge
step can be skipped and features that encode assembly trees
described in Tailored Seal are kept for summarization. Thus
we are capable of providing the inspector a quick and a con-
cise summary. It comes with the cost that depending on the
number of additional features created, Seal would affect the
scalability of Ettu with respect to memory consumption of
FP Tree and speed of clustering. It may also affect cluster-
ing result as it changes the feature vector. Measuring and
understanding the overall effect of applying property Seal
are left for future work.
Figure 5 shows an example AST resulting from a rule that
only encodes the parental relationship between any node in
query AST and the whole subtree rooted at one of its child
node. The AST is generated from a query and summariza-
tion information of the query set that it belongs to. The
10 features shown with colored nodes appears at least once
in every query in the query set. The legend shows that
how many times the feature appears in all queries as “Total
occurrence”, and in the example query itself as “Query oc-
currence.” What makes this query different from the other
ones is the uncolored nodes. They either don’t appear in
the other queries, or appear infrequently. This visualization
makes a human inspector’s work easier to spot important
features and understand what the queries in the groups do,
and identify why a query is different from the other queries.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we run experiments on our proposed frame-
work to verify its performance and feasibility. We are specif-
ically interested in two properties of Ettu’s log classifier.
First is whether or not our system can capture the notion
of query intents through clustering queries by their similar-
ity levels. To answer this question, we ran an experiment
to measure the level of correspondence between clustering
results from Ettu and one from manual human inspection.
As we will show, there is a high correlation between Ettu
and manual clustering. Second, especially given that clus-
tering in general has O(N2) scaling in the data size, we want
to show that Ettu’s clustering performs well enough to be
practical for use in corporate settings. As shown in the ex-
periments, Ettu can cope very well with large data sizes even
on commodity desktop computers.
The data we use to run our experiments is based on SQL
query logs that capture all query activity on the major-
ity of databases at a major US bank over a period of ap-
proximately 19 hours. Logs are anonymized by replacing
all constants with hash values generated by SHA-256, and
manually vetted for safety. Table 2 and Table 3 show sum-
maries of our dataset. Of the nearly 78 million database
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Figure 5: An example AST of a SQL query where the common features that appears in all queries in the query group are
colored and the uncolored nodes are specific only to that query.
operations captured, 61 million are not directly queries, but
rather invocations of stored procedures. The aim of this
paper is to study query clustering specifically, so we ignore
these queries. Of the the 17 million SQL statements in the
trace, we were able to reliably parse 2.8 million. Of these,
we base our analysis on the 1.35 million syntactically valid
SELECT queries.
Our first observation is that of these 1.35 million queries,
there are only 1614 different query skeletons. The number of
distinct structures that Ettu needs to cluster is quite small.
Furthermore, this number grows sub-linearly over time. As
shown in Table 4, nearly half of all the skeletons arise in the
first 1.5 hours of the trace.
Not a query 61,041,543
Un-parsable queries 14,138,723
Parsable queries 2,818,719
Total 77,998,985
Table 2: Breakdown of bank data set.
In the set of parsable queries in Table 2, the distribution
of different types of queries is shown in Table 3.
6.1 Feasibility
Our first goal is to understand whether clustering queries
based on structural similarity, and in particular our use of
the generalized W-L algorithm, produces meaningful results:
Is log summarization even feasible in the first place? In
order to demonstrate the feasibility of log summarization,
SELECT 1,349,861
UNION 1,306
INSERT 1,173,140
UPDATE 288,098
DELETE 6,314
Total 2,818,719
Table 3: Distribution of query types in bank dataset.
we compare Ettu’s query clustering with an“intuitive”query
similarity metric applied.
To make a meaningful manual clustering tractable, we
selected a sample of 140 query skeletons (about 10%) and
grouped them manually by attempting to infer the query’s
“intent” and creating clusters of queries with similar intents.
Example 8. An example of two structurally similar queries
in the set of 140 query skeletons that are grouped together in
manual clustering:
SELECT historytran .*
FROM historytran LEFT JOIN feestate AS feestate
ON feestate.seqhistorytran = historytran.seq
WHERE (historytran.caseid = ’’) AND
isnull(feestate.rechargestate , ’’) IN (’’, ’’)
ORDER BY historytran.txdate DESC ,
historytran.txtime DESC
SELECT historytran .*
FROM historytran LEFT JOIN feestate AS feestate
ON feestate.seqhistorytran = historytran.seq
WHERE (historytran.caseid = ’’) AND
feestate.reversestate = ’’ AND
isnull(feestate.rechargestate , ’’) NOT IN (’’, ’’)
ORDER BY historytran.txdate DESC ,
historytran.txtime DESC
When observing these queries, one can notice that they are
exactly the same, except that second query contains WHERE
expression with an additional AND phrase and 3rd term is
NOT IN instead of IN . From these two queries, a human in-
spector judged that they share similar intent and group them
into one cluster with the reason that they select the same set
of columns, show the results in same order, get data from
same tables, and have similar WHERE condition.
The chance of false positives in a sample is governed by
the birthday paradox; The chance of picking similar, but un-
related skeletons for our sample grows with the square of the
sample size. To make our sampled results meaningful and
increase the chance of false positives, we generated the 140
skeleton sample biased towards skeletons that share common
terms and features (e.g., queries over the same relations).
We used Ettu to cluster the 140 query skeleton sample us-
ing hierarchical clustering and manually grouped the same
set of queries. By hand, we identified 23 specific clusters
of similar queries. To roughly visualize the correspondences
between manual and automated clustering, Figure 6 shows
a tanglegram [13] view of the clusters. Ettu’s clustering
selections are shown as a dendrogram on the left of the tan-
glegram. The x-coordinate of each branch signifies the dis-
tance between the clusters being merged. The further to the
right the branch appears, the more similar the clusters being
merged. Each leaf is one of the 140 query skeletons. The
manual clustering appears on the right of the tanglegram;
Group assignments are fixed, and hence there are only two
levels of the “tree”. Lines in the middle link skeletons in
Ettu’s clustering with the manual clustering.
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Figure 6: Correspondences between hierarchical clustering
obtained from Ettu and from manual grouping.
One measure of degree of correspondences between two
trees is number of crossings of lines connecting two labels.
The lower the number is, the higher correspondence between
two trees is. However, aligning two trees so that the number
of crossings is minimum is an NP-hard problem [14]. Fig-
ure 6 was produced using the Dendextend R package [13],
which minimizes the number of crossings but does not guar-
antee an optimal alignment. However, even with this figure,
we qualitatively observe a large number of parallel lines (an
indicator of good alignment between clustering results).
To measure the correspondence more quantitatively, we
use a metric called entanglement [13], also implemented by
Dendextend. Entanglement score ranges from 0 (no entan-
glement) and 1 (full entanglement). To compute an entan-
glement score, we first construct a vector for each cluster-
ing from the integer positions of each query in the dendro-
gram. The entanglement score is computed as the L-norm
distance between these two vectors. For the tanglegram in
Figure 6, the L-2 entanglement score is 0.17, which indicates
a high degree of correlation between the two clusterings.
This demonstrates that Ettu’s distance metrics, based on
structural similarity, do in fact correspond to more intuitive
notions of query similarity.
Surprisingly, a significant number of the alignment errors
detected above are attributable (in retrospect) to human er-
ror rather than to Ettu. After performing this experiment,
we manually inspected the misalignments in Figure 6 to bet-
ter understand how Ettu was breaking. In doing so, we
found that many of the misalignments were actually mis-
takes in the manual grouping rather than the automated
clustering algorithm. The reason for this error was that our
manual clustering decisions were heavily biased by similari-
ties between the first few words of each query: SELECT and
the project targets. Conversely, Ettu’s automated clustering
is able to identify similarity in substructures as well as at
the root of the query.
6.2 Scalability
Our second goal is to demonstrate the scalability of our
proposed framework. There are two components to this
framework: The initial clustering process which can be per-
formed offline, and the interactive FP-tree explorer. Con-
cretely, we aim to show three properties of this framework.
First, the time taken by the offline component should be
reasonable compared to the duration of the log. The system
is not useful if it takes the better part of a day to cluster a
day’s worth of queries. Second, the added compute require-
ments of additional queries should likewise be reasonable.
Finally, the FP-tree explorer should be able to re-render a
feature set at interactive speed.
The bank query log starts at about 11 AM. To test scala-
bility, we vary the number of queries processed by truncating
the log after varying lengths; After 1.5 hours, the log con-
tains 250 thousand SELECT queries with 756 skeletons, just
over 500 thousand queries after 3.3 hours, and so forth. Full
statistics for each truncated log are shown in Table 4.
Experiments were performed on a commodity laptop com-
puter with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB
RAM memory running OS X 10.11.3. We used the R imple-
mentation of hierarchical clustering. The remaining compo-
nents were implemented in Java using the single-threaded
JDK 1.8.0. Reported running times are the average of 10
trials for each phase.
The clustering process is performed in three distinct phases:
End Time Total Time SELECTs Skeletons
12:34 PM 1.5 hours 250,740 756
14:24 PM 3.3 hours 512,981 946
16:06 PM 5 hours 789,050 1,057
18:27 PM 7.3 hours 972,511 1,102
21:23 PM 10.3 hours 1,079,427 1,130
00:43 AM 13.6 hours 1,176,582 1,256
04:04 AM 17 hours 1,270,984 1,576
06:28 AM 19.4 hours 1,349,861 1,614
Table 4: Summary of query log sizes by absolute time.
(1) A preprocessing phase where the full query log is
rewritten into a bag of query skeletons, (2) A relabeling
phase where the generalized W-L algorithm is applied to
each query skeleton to extract feature vectors, (3) A clus-
tering phase that actually groups queries by similarity, and
finally (4) A FP tree construction phase in which each
cluster of query skeletons is summarized using FP tree. Fig-
ure 7 shows the running time for phases 1 and 3. Phase 2
and phase 4 take almost no time by comparison and is shown
independently in Figure 8.
The running time of phase 1 grows sub-linearly with the
log size. We attribute this to the dominant costs being re-
source allocation associated with defining and indexing new
query skeletons, and potentially JIT compilation overheads.
The running time of phase 2 has (relatively) high upfront
costs, predominantly digest(·) needing to index newly al-
located feature identifiers, but quickly levels off into a lin-
ear scaling with the number of queries. The running time
of phase 3 grows super-linearly with the number of query
skeletons. This is typical for clustering processes in gen-
eral, which need to compute and evaluate a full (O(N2))
pairwise distance matrix. Fortunately, the number of skele-
tons grows sub-linearly with the number of queries, and the
overall scaling by time is roughly linear; We expect that this
growth curve would eventually become sub-linear for longer
traces. Phase 4 runs quite fast because of relatively small
number of query skeletons.
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ing phase with respect to different log size.
With running time breaks down into steps as shown in
Figure 7 and Figure 8, we can observe that the bottleneck
of our system is in hierarchical clustering in which running
time grows quadratically fast as the log size grows. How-
ever, our experiments, even with single-threaded on com-
modity hardware, were able to cluster the trace of parseable
queries in under 15 minutes. We can reasonably expect the
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Figure 8: Running time of relabeling phase and FP tree
construction phase with respect to different log size.
clustering process to scale to even larger workloads, espe-
cially considering the embarrassingly parallelizable nature
of clustering.
7. RELATEDWORK
The basic idea behind Ettu is to profile normal user be-
havior, detect suspicious behavior using this information,
and distinguish malicious behavior from benign intents [15].
Indeed, this idea is not new; there are many anomaly detec-
tion systems focusing on suspicious behavior of users. Spe-
cific examples include file access [16] and transfers [17], on-
line and social behavior [18], activities on a website [19],
command-line statements [20] and SQL queries issued to a
database [21].
SQL queries as a resource: As the basic unit of in-
teraction between a database and its users, the sequence of
SQL queries that a user issues effectively models the user’s
behavior.
One approach relies on the syntax of queries [22] and it
permits fast query validation where they focus on detection
of potential intrusions on database systems. In their paper,
they introduce a mechanism which analyzes audit logs of
databases with both defined user roles and undefined user
roles. This system uses multiple techniques to attempt to de-
tect the threats depending on the role distinction. They use
Naive Bayes Classifier and clustering techniques, k-centers
and k-means, in their experiments to build user profiles. The
techniques were able to produce low false positives in ex-
perimental testing, but the false negative rates were high
for both techniques. Their work shows that building user
profiles from database logs has potential for detecting in-
trusions, especially in a system with defined roles. Ettu,
however, takes a different approach in creating the feature
vectors exploiting subtree similarities instead of individual
feature similarities, in order to address the problem when the
syntax is much different but the main intent of the query is
similar.
Another method is to use a data–centric approach, which
performs better in detecting anomalies [21]. In the paper,
a set of techniques are used to detect anomalies on the re-
sults of SQL queries rather than the queries themselves. In
doing this, the authors are able to improve both where the
syntax–based methods miss a potentially harmful query and
when there is a false positive. These errors can occur in the
syntax–based system when two queries with seemingly sim-
ilar structures have vastly different results, as well as when
two queries appear unrelated but actually return the exact
same set of data. The limitation of this approach is that the
dataset should remain static for effective results but still the
potential in the data–centric model is quite promising. How-
ever, to evaluate the efficacy of such a system in a realistic
way, access to data in a corporate database is required.
This brings us back to the problem that, many organiza-
tions do not allow third party softwares to access their sensi-
tive data, let alone letting them to be used for research pur-
poses [15]. Hence, auditing SQL query logs of the databases
and having a sense of what the query intends to do correctly
gains a lot of importance. Our eventual goal is extend our
syntactic visualization strategy to support data–aware visu-
alization and query auditing, in this work we focus on the
core components of clustering queries and generating cluster
visualizations.
Query visualization: Generating query cluster visual-
izations is a complex task considering that even visualizing
just one query accurately to help users understand the intent
behind the query quickly is still a research challenge [23].
QueryViz [24] addresses query interpretation which is the
problem of understanding the goal of the query by visualiz-
ing it. Query interpretation is usually as hard as writing a
new query as the complexity of the query increases [23]. It
takes SQL query and the schema of the database; and parses
the query, builds an AST and creates a graph for users to
view it. The aim is to present queries as simple as possible
for the users to understand them, as it is easier to under-
stand the relationships and references in a query when it is
graphically visualized.
Logos [25], on the other hand, is a system that has the
ability to translate SQL queries into natural language equiv-
alents. This technology works by creating graph represen-
tations of the query structure. These representations then
use predefined relationships within the database schema to
allow for construction of natural language expressions. De-
spite the high overhead of maintaining the relationships for
the database, this technology shows promise in revealing the
intent of user queries.
We take a similar approach as QueryViz [24], but we in-
clude the common features of all queries in the query repre-
sentation, so that the users can see what features are unique
to the query and what features are shared by all the queries
in the query groups.
Distinguishing queries: There are different approaches
to understand the intents behind SQL queries and what a
query returns. Analyzing query intents can help in different
research topics like creating indices, benchmark design, and
masquerade detection in databases.
QueryScope [26] starts with the hypothesis that visual-
ization of queries would help identifying similar queries and
distinguishing different ones from each other, hence it would
help finding better tuning opportunities. The system pro-
vides a user interface to visualize SQL queries. This inter-
face presents these queries as graphs in order to make the
structure more understandable. To construct these graphs,
the structure of the query is broken down into XML format
prior to visualization. The proposed use of this interface
is for tuning of database systems, although the breakdown
of these queries proposes the potential for detecting simi-
larity between different queries. Our approach is similar to
the individual queries but we focus on describing query sets.
While they directly focus on similarities of queries by finding
the critical elements of the query using the table relation-
ships and table cardinalities, we make use of the subtree
similarities.
XData [27] is a system which uses a technique that al-
lows SQL queries to be tested for mutations to the intended
query. In doing this, queries that have slight differences and
that look to return the same result as a correct query will be
marked as incorrect if they produce different results. This
technology is intended for use in grading student work, al-
though other uses are possible. In order to determine the
correctness of a query, the correct query must have con-
straints created to represent possible mutations. The au-
thors explain each aspect of a SQL query for which a muta-
tion can occur, and for each they use tuples to store the pos-
sible mutations. By doing this, all possibly mutation com-
binations can be presented for comparison against question-
able queries. In testing against student work, this technique
was able to correctly identify over 95 percent of incorrect
mutants presented.
A method for maintaining privacy in databases via audit-
ing is presented in [28] which discusses an auditing frame-
work that allows for analysts to ensure compliance of certain
privacy guarantees. Audit expressions are used in their pa-
per to establish this notion of privacy in the database along
with the concept of an indispensable tuple. This means that
the removal of this tuple will affect the result of the query
in question. By using this concept, the authors detail a
methodology in which audit logs can be constructed that
will reveal any privacy violations.
If the data for the target database is available, our pro-
posed framework can be augmented by using methods pro-
posed in above discussed data–centric approaches [27,28].
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The focus of this paper is to summarize large query logs
by clustering them according to their similarity with the
hypothesis that the similarity in query structure corresponds
to the intent of the query.We utilize a revised Weisfeiler–
Lehman algorithm to create features out of query logs, form
feature vectors out of them, and cluster the similar queries
together by their feature vectors with hierarchical clustering
method. Finally, we exploit FP Trees to create summaries of
the clustered query sets. In our experiments, we show that
(1) the structural similarity of queries corresponds to the
intent of the query by comparing the groupings performed
by a human expert and our system, and (2) even with a
commodity laptop and single-threaded implementation, the
process could be performed in under 15 minutes for a set of
1.35 million queries.
We plan to extend our work in several directions: First,
we will explore new feature weighting strategies and new
labeling rules in order to capture the intent behind logged
queries better. Second, we will examine user interfaces that
better present clusters of queries — Different feature sorting
strategies in an FP Tree in order to help the user distinguish
important and irrelevant features, for example.
Scenario 2. Jane inspects the query group summaries
presented by Ettu and labels these groups as safe, unsafe,
and unknown. Ettu repeats the auditing process to elaborate
the groups on unknown clusters, so that they can be labeled
as safe and unsafe, too.
Third, further exploration on various kinds of statistics
captured in FP Tree will help us in determining the quality
of the cluster, weighting of features, and identifying suspi-
cious paths. Lastly, we will investigate the effect of tempo-
rality on query clustering.
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